rushmore loan management lawsuit

Applicable Law: 15 U.S.C. 15 U.S.C. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). 2011) (quoting Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Here, there was no such threat of an IRS penalty. Rushmore argues that Plaintiffs' FDCPA and FCCPA claims are precluded and preempted by the Bankruptcy Code because the claims are "based on the mistaken belief that Rushmore was prohibited from having any post-discharge communications with Plaintiff[s]." . R. Civ. Beginning in February 2014, Rushmore sent three written forms to Plaintiffs: Mortgage Statement I, Mortgage Statement II, and a Request for Taxpayer Identification Number ("Request for TIN"). 37 at 12). For the same reasons explained in connection with Mortgage Statement I, see supra Part IV.A.1.a.ii, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Rushmore had actual knowledge that it violated § 559.72(9) as to Mortgage Statement II. Fla. 2016) (quoting Pinson v. Albertelli Law Partners LLC, 618 F. App'x. 2d at 1358). (Id. At the bottom of page one is a detachable payment coupon, which lists a "Due Date," "Amount Due," a "Late Payment Amount" and instructions to make checks payable to Rushmore. "Additionally, the Court need not determine whether the named plaintiff or other putative plaintiffs read or were confused by the notice, as the standard is whether the least sophisticated consumer would have been misled." For similar reasons, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Mortgage Statement I was false, deceptive, or misleading to the least sophisticated consumer. How to Stop a Debt Collector from Calling You Repeatedly, Yelling, swearing, and using threatening language, Refusing to report to the credit bureaus that a debt is in dispute, Calling you at work after they’ve been advised that such calls are not allowed, Pretending to be government agents or police officers planning to arrest you, Threatening legal action they cannot take or have no intention of taking, Calling you outside of the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. in your time zone, Contacting her directly when she was represented by an attorney, Using false, deceptive, and misleading means to collect a debt, Misrepresenting the legal status of the debt. However, for two years I have attempted to get a loan modification from Nationstar Mortgage LLC. Deceiving consumers is illegal and you could receive both statutory damages of $1,000 and your attorney’s fees. § 524(j). ¶¶ 32-51). However, the test is an "objective" one, designed both to protect naïve consumers and prevent "liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices." Prindle Tr. ¶ 82. 37-3 at 46:23-47:4). RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC, Defendant. "Obviously, communications that expressly demand payment will almost certainly have this purpose." 729 F. Supp. The debtors had vacated the property on October 20, 2009, nearly one month prior to the November 15, 2009 debt validation notice."). Specifically, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. (Doc. Finally, in Count IV, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Rushmore's conduct was unlawful, an injunction prohibiting Rushmore from sending documents requesting payment on discharged debts, and an order requiring Rushmore to "disgorge all ill-gotten gains" under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. The Court cannot locate a copy of the February 2014 statement. 551, 553 (11th Cir. (Doc. 3d at 1327 (emphasis in original). Cf. . 33) is GRANTED as to Count III; the motion is otherwise DENIED. Neither party does an exceptional job supporting its assertions concerning the viability of the FCCPA claim. (Id. For instance, while Mortgage Statement II contains the same disclaimer language on the top, right-hand corner of the first page, it eliminates the payment coupon and replaces it with additional, stronger disclaimer language. Fla. 2016) ("Although the Florida law is modeled after its federal counterpart, `the two statutes are not identical.'" Session Time out Your session has timed out. The state court entered a final judgment of foreclosure on August 28, 2014, (Doc. . (Doc. Dec. 13, 2012). (emphasis added)); Helman, 85 F. Supp. Sterling Lindsay, Plaintiff, represented by, Rachel Lindsay, Plaintiff, represented by, Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by. The law requires debt collectors to treat you with fairness, dignity, and respect, but this is not always what happens. 1 at 5). (Doc. 2d at 1358 ("And the purpose of the letter was to inform Plaintiff of the assignment of the account to Defendant. at 19 ("Thus, the communications from a lienholder seeking payment, as long as the debtor continues to reside in the home, is permissible under the Bankruptcy Code." Accordingly, Rushmore's request for summary judgment as to Mortgage Statement II is due to be denied. Further, the inconsistencies between the disclaimer language and amounts due on Mortgage Statement II could mislead the least sophisticated consumer, even despite the lack of a payment coupon. 33-6), but were properly distributed in April 2015. 650, 652 (Bankr. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 1999), namely that Rushmore needed only to review the filings in the related bankruptcy proceeding and its own records to know that such claims were false. § 2601 et seq., is denied. 2011)). 's Mot. 2014) (finding the safe harbor provided by § 524(j) was unavailable to defendants where "[t]he . Listed below are those cases in which this Featured Case is cited. ¶¶ 94-95. United States District Court, M.D. Informed a party about your debt other than an attorney or your spouse (e.g. . ¶ 84). 33), to which Plaintiffs Randolph and Tabetha Sellers responded (Doc. RANDOLPH SELLERS, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated and TABETHA SELLERS, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, . Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) ("The Court agrees that Plaintiff has conflated the FDCPA's requirements with the FCCPA's provisions, without demonstrating the basis for its legal theory. Courts have found that a defendant's knowledge of a plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding is sufficient to allow an FCCPA claim to survive summary judgment in these circumstances. Id. § 2605(f). Click on the case name to see the full text of the citing case. Battle v. Gladstone Law Grp., P.A., 951 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1315 (S.D. Rushmore does little more than quote the text of the statute in arguing that it is not subject to the FDCPA and fails to address this issue in any additional detail in its reply. Fla. May 5, 2015); Parker, 874 F. Supp. Sellers's mother's home rather than be evicted. v. Located directly beneath that box in a separate box is a disclaimer: Below the disclaimer box is another box entitled "Explanation of Amount Due," which itemizes the principal, interest, escrow, regular monthly payment, total fees and charges, and overdue payment on the loan. Next, beginning in December 2014 and through June 2015, on the first of each month, Rushmore sent Plaintiffs a new form of the mortgage statement.4 Mortgage Statement II contains the same box at the top right corner listing a "Payment Due Date," "Amount Due," and a sentence informing the recipient that if payment is received after a certain date, a late fee will be charged. (Id. Plaintiffs allege that this conduct violates § 1692e, which prohibits the use of false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt, and § 1692e(2)(A), because the collection activities falsely represented the character, amount or legal status of a debt. 33) is GRANTED as to Count III; the motion is otherwise DENIED. 2013). 37 at 5), and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale on October 4, 2014 (Doc. The Company offers performing and non-performing residential mortgage loans. She had already hired an attorney to represent her in the case, which was over five years old, but collectors allegedly persisted in contacting her directly. According to Plaintiffs, this language undercuts the disclaimers upon which Rushmore relies. . . 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. Emotional distress has been recognized as actual damages with respect to RESPA claims. ¶¶ 70-86). Id. First, Kuehn involved the FDCPA, rather than the FCCPA, and is thus inapposite. Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC provides financial services. Servicing, Inc., No. 10. 12, 2011). Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1252-53 (11th Cir. At oral argument, Rushmore could not convincingly argue that it had any good reason to send Plaintiffs monthly statements following the foreclosure sale. Id. at 83. Plaintiffs state that they did not reaffirm the debt due to the continuously increasing balance on the loan. 11 U.S.C. 37 at 17). 33-10) ("This communication is from a debt collector. At that point, Plaintiffs had neither an in personam nor an in rem interest in the property, yet Rushmore continued sending monthly mortgage statements to them. Similar to certain elements of a mortgage statement in Prindle, Mortgage Statement I lists amounts due, the dates they are due, provides a means of payment via the detachable payment coupon, and a late payment amount, which could be read to imply a financial penalty for failure to timely pay the amount due. ¶ 60, when the maximum amount due was $87,370.62, id. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir. As an initial matter, Count III alleges that the Request for TIN violates the FCCPA, not the FDCPA. Servicing Corp., 163 F.Supp.3d 1240, 1245 (M.D. Click on the case name to see the full text of the citing case. (Doc. the bankruptcy was on file." (citing Fla. Stat. 37 at 18). "The discharge injunction does not prohibit every communication between a creditor and debtor—only those designed to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor." Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Rita Ting Hopper , Atlantic Law Group LLC. In considering Rushmore's motion to dismiss, I have only looked at those exhibits attached to the Lindsays' pleadings or those exhibits attached to the parties' filings with respect to this motion that are integral to the amended complaint and whose authenticity has not been disputed. If you remain idle, your session will timeout in 2 minutes. As the Prindle court explained, § 524(j)12 "permits a creditor holding a security interest in real property that is the principal residence of the debtor to seek and collect periodic payments associated with a valid security interest in lieu of pursuit of in rem relief to enforce the lien, even though the debt has been discharged." . The motion for class certification is a bit of a mess; it contains errors, cites exhibits not in the record, and certain sections lack citations to Eleventh Circuit authority. P. 8, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Listed below are those cases in which this Featured Case is cited. 113, 119 (Bankr. (Id. At oral argument, Rushmore argued that Plaintiffs have "narrowed" the proposed class. While the two statutes are certainly similar in their design and objectives, "they are not identical." Cal. 31). In determining whether a debt collector's communication violates § 1692e, courts in the Eleventh Circuit employ the "least-sophisticated consumer" standard. Code § 14-201 et seq., is denied. Fed. Opp'n 1. M.D. ¶¶ 35-37. See, e.g., Doc. P. 8(a)(2), and must state "a plausible claim for relief," as "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

Shadow And Bone Synopsis, Lock Up Your Daughters T-shirt, Call It Spring Men's Shoes Uk, Shirley Stoler Height, Shining Star Muppets From Space, Rich Piana Workout Routine,